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Abstract
The main purpose of any combat is to achieve a quick and decisive result and thereby 
avoid high losses in personnel and materiel. The enemy can be defeated by weakening 
his forces over time. However, such an approach to warfare would generally lead to 
high losses and require a lot of time. The gap between tactics on one hand and strategy 
and policy on the other cannot be overcome by physical combat alone. The tactical 
framework is too narrow to ensure the most decisive of one’s forces. This is the main 
reason for the need for an intermediate field of study in practice between strategy 
and tactics known as operations or operational art. This third component of art of 
war serves as both a bridge and an interface between policy and strategy on the one 
hand and tactics on the other. Generally, the smaller the forces, the more critical is to 
apply operational art properly. The history of past wars has demonstrated that neither 
superior technology nor superb tactics can ensure, by themselves, victory in a war.
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Glavna svrha bilo koje oružane borbe je postići brz i odlučujući rezultat i time izbjeći 
velike gubitke u osoblju i opremi. Neprijatelj može biti poražen slabljenjem njegovih 
snaga tijekom vremena. Međutim, takav pristup ratovanju općenito bi doveo do velikih 
gubitaka i zahtijeva mnogo vremena. Jaz između taktike s jedne strane i strategije i 
politike s druge strane ne može se nadvladati samo fizičkim aspektom oružane borbe. 
Taktički okvir preuzak je da bi se dobilo najodlučnije od svojih snaga. To je glavni 
razlog za potrebu za prijelaznim područjem studija u praksi između strategije i 
taktike, poznatog kao operacije ili operativno umijeće. Ova treća sastavnica ratnog 
umijeća služi i kao most i kao područje dodira politike i strategije s jedne strane i 
taktike s druge strane. Općenito, što su nečije snage manje, to je kritičnije ispravno 
primijeniti operativno umijeće. Povijest prošlih ratova pokazala je da ni vrhunska 
tehnologija ni izvanredna taktika ne mogu samostalno zajamčiti pobjedu u ratu.
Ključne riječi:
borba, sastavnica vojnog umijeća, doktrina, uporaba, razmještaj, velika taktika, 
združena doktrina, logistička potpora, oprema, vojna strategija, cilj, operatika, 
operativno umijeće, operacijska izvrsnost, operacijski zapovjednik, operativna razina, 
operacijski cilj, operacije, politika, granska doktrina, strateška razina, strateški cilj, 
strategija, taktička izvrsnost, taktika, tehnološki napredak, tehnološka nadmoć, 
terminologija, termini, ratovanje
The main purpose of any combat is to achieve a quick and decisive result and 
thereby avoid high losses in personnel and materiel. The enemy can be defeated 
by gradually weakening his forces over time or by conducting attritional 
warfare. However, such an approach to warfare would generally lead to 
high losses and require extraordinary long time.  Any war is a combination 
of decisive operations and attrition. The key for shortening a war is to avoid 
attrition at the operational and strategic level. The tactical framework is too 
narrow to ensure the most decisive employment of one’s forces. Hence, the need 
for another component of military art known as operations or operational art. This 
component occupies and intermediate position between strategy and tactics. 
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The results of tactical actions are useful only when linked together as part of 
a larger design framed by strategy and orchestrated by operational art. 
Problems of Terminology
In contrast to strategy and tactics, there is much confusion about what 
constitutes the third component of the art of war or operational art. In the 
past, many different terms were used in referring directly or indirectly to 
operational art. The problem is compounded by a lack of agreement on 
the real purpose of operational art. In the past, the terms grand tactics and 
operations referred to what is today known as operational art. A well-known 
and influential French general, Count Jacques Antoine Hippolyte de Guibert 
(1743–1790), is credited as the first to use the term grand tactics. For General 
Antoine-Henri de Jomini (1779–1869) the art of war consisted of five distinct 
parts, including grand and minor tactics (Jomini, 1992:p. 13). He defined grand 
tactics as “the art of making good combinations preliminary to battles, as 
well as during their progress. The guiding principle in tactical combinations, 
as in those of strategy, is to bring the mass of the forces in hand against a part 
of the opposing army, and upon that point the possession of which promises 
the most important results” (Jomini, 1992: p.178). Jomini used the term minor 
tactics for what is today commonly understood as tactics. 
The British general J.F.C. Fuller (1878–1966) wrote prolifically about the 
theory of operational warfare. Like Guibert and Jomini, he used the term 
grand tactics in referring to the intermediate field of study and practice 
between strategy and tactics. Fuller wrote that, once the grand strategist has 
correlated and adjusted one’s forces to the political object, the next step is to 
endow them with structure so that they can be operated, and this is the duty 
of the grand tactician. The grand tactician assumes control of the forces as 
they are distributed and arranges them according to the resistance they are 
likely to meet. This arrangement constitutes the plan of the war or campaign, 
and if the spirit of the plan is the political object, then the heart of the plan is 
the military object (Fuller, 1925: p.107).
After 1866, Field Marshal Helmuth von Moltke the Elder (1857–1888), the 
chief of the Prussian/German great general staff, used the term operation 
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(ger. Operation) in referring to the still-emerging level of military art between 
strategy and tactics. He used that term (ger. Schlacht) almost exclusively to 
mean the movement of large forces before a major battle (Wieker, 1987:p. 8; 
English, 1996:p.8; Sodenstern, 1953:p.53; Besterhorn, 1999:p.7). In his view, a 
major battle was a matter of strategy. Moltke the Elder also introduced into 
German military theory the term operativ (loosely translated as operational), 
pertaining to an operation (Ilsemann, 1988: p. 22). Moltke the Elder as chief 
of the great general staff was solely responsible for the conduct of operations, 
that is, the execution of the campaign plan and war plan (Greiner, 1965:p.394). 
By the late 19th century, operations had emerged as an intermediate area 
of study and practice in the German military (Hanisch, 1998:p.4; Förster, 
1993:pp.254–255). An operation pertains to an army’s deployment between 
the initial deployment and the tasks aimed at resolving a major battle 
(Sodenstern, 1953:p.54). In the German-speaking militaries, other terms used 
alternatively today are operational leadership (ger. Operative Fűhrung) and control 
of operation (ger. Operationsfűhrung).
By the turn of the 20th century, Russian theoreticians used the terms grand 
tactics and applied strategy in referring to the intermediate level between 
strategy and tactics. They were much influenced by the writings of Moltke the 
Elder and his interpreters (Kipp, 1987:p.5). In 1907, based on the experiences 
of the Russo-Japanese War of 1904–1905, the Russians introduced a new 
term, operatika (pertaining to operations), to explain the new phenomena of 
armed conflict (Kersnovskiy, 1939:p.31), while other sources claim that the 
term operatika was coined in 1912 (Mariyevskiy, 1995:p.245). The term was 
attributed to A.V. Gerua and E.E. Messner. In their view, strategy dealt with 
waging war as a whole while operatika pertained to the conduct of the battle 
at the army level. Tactics referred to conducting combat from the army corps 
level and down. This early division of military art into strategy, operatika, 
and tactics was a significant development because, eventually, it helped to 
separate operations from strategy and tactics (Harrison, 2001:p.29).
 The Soviets/Russians and all formerly communist-dominated 
militaries used the term operational art. In contrast, the Chinese military 
use the term science of campaign. The term operational art was coined by 
the former tsarist general, and one of the most important Soviet military 
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theoreticians, Aleksandr’ A. Svechin (1878–1938), in his book Strategy 
(rus. Strategiya), published in 1923 and 1927 (Varfolomeyev, 1928:p. 84)2. 
He explained that “tactical activity is governed by operational art (rus. 
operativnoye iskusstvo). Combat operations are not self-contained. They are 
only the basic material from which an operation is formed. Only in rare cases 
can one rely on achieving the ultimate objective of combat operations in a 
single battle. Normally, the path to the ultimate objective is divided into a 
series of operations, separated, more or less, by lengthy pauses, which take 
place in different areas in a theatre and differ significantly from each other 
owing to the differences between the immediate objectives that one’s forces 
temporarily strive for (Svechin, 1992:pp. 68–69). For Svechin, the purpose of 
operational art was to focus on the study and practice of operations (major 
operations in US terms). He defined an operation as “an act of war if the efforts 
of troops are directed towards the achievement of certain intermediate objective 
in a certain theatre of military operations (rus. teatr’ voyennykh deystvii) without 
any interruption” (Svechin, 1992:p.69).
Between the 1920s and the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991, the Soviets 
retained Svechin’s understanding of operational art, except for some changes 
in wording. In the late 1980s, the Soviets described operational art as being 
“concerned with the study of the rules, nature, and character of contemporary 
operations; working out the means for preparing and conducting combat 
operations; determining the function of large forces (fronts, armies) and 
formations (corps, divisions) of the armed forces; establishing means and 
methods for organising and supporting continuing cooperation, security, 
and command and control of forces in combat; delineating the organisational 
and equipment requirements of large units of the armed forces; working out 
the nature and methods of operational training for officers and command and 
control organs; developing recommendations for the operational preparation 
of a theatre of military operations; and investigating the enemy view on the 
conduct of operational-level military operations” (Glantz, 1991:pp.10–11).
In contrast to the systematic German and Soviet approaches to studying 
2  The Soviet military theoretician Nikolai Varfolomeyev (1890–1939) credited Svechin 
with the first use of that term as early as 1922.
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operational art, the US military concentrated, during the interwar years, on the 
practice of planning and war-gaming the employment of large army formations 
and fleets. As a result, the US military was relatively well prepared for planning 
and conducting campaigns and major operations in several theatres during 
World War II. However, in the aftermath of the war, all of the lessons seemed 
to have been forgotten. In the 1950s, the US military tended to belittle the 
importance of operational art. The US services considered the Korean War 
(1950–1953) as an anomaly in the nuclear world. In the late 1950s and 1960s, 
the emphasis was on fighting insurgencies. The services did not believe in 
the value of joint training. Instead, they favoured tactical training in the 
army, fleet exercises in the navy and strategic studies in the air force (Holder, 
1990:p.86).
The US services discovered the importance of being ready to fight a high-
intensity conventional war in the aftermath of the Vietnam War. This, in turn, 
led to a steadily increasing interest in operational art. The US Army led the 
way. It created the former Soviet Army Studies Office in Fort Leavenworth, 
Kansas, in 1986 (its name was changed in 1991 to FMSO-Foreign Military 
Studies Office). The focus of the new office was a study of Soviet operational art. 
In 1982, the US Army was the first service to incorporate tenets of operational 
art in its doctrine. For example, in 1986, the US Army defined operational art 
as “the employment of military forces to attain strategic goals in a theatre of 
war or theatre of operations through the design, organisation, and conduct 
of campaigns and major operations” (US DoA HQ, 1986:p.10). The definition 
changed somewhat in 2001. Operational art was subsequently defined as 
“a component of military art concerned with planning, coordinating, and 
sequencing the outcomes of individual tactical events into a chain of linked 
actions, within the context of major operations and campaigns, to achieve the 
objectives established by a theater strategy” (Runnels, 1987:p.47). Since then, 
the US Army has revised the definition of operational art several times. For 
example, in 2010, operational art was described as “the application of creative 
imagination by commanders and staffs supported by their skill, knowledge, 
and experiences to design strategies, campaigns, and major operations and 
organize and employ military forces.” Operational art “integrates ends, 
ways, and means across the levels of war” (US DoA HQ, 1986:p.GL-7). Both 
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of the latest versions of FM 3-0 Operations (2017) and Joint Publication (JP) 3-0: 
Joint Operations (2017) defined operational art as the “cognitive approach by 
commanders and staffs – supported by their skill, knowledge, experience, 
creativity, and judgement – to develop strategies, campaigns, and operations 
to organize and employ military forces by integrating ends, ways, and means” 
(US DoA HQ, 2017:p.GL-13). All of these definitions, however, contain several 
inaccuracies. For example, “designing strategies” is not a domain of operational 
art but of strategy and policy. The terms “ends, ways, and means” are usually 
related to strategy not operational art. Operational art is not applied “across the 
levels of war” but only at the operational and military/theatre-strategic levels. A 
sound definition should also state clearly that the operational art is both a science 
and an art. Among other failings, the ultimate objective of campaigns and major 
operations was left unstated.
What is operational art?
In generic terms, operational art can be defined as a component of military 
art concerned with the theory and practice of planning, preparing, conducting, 
and sustaining campaigns and major operations aimed at accomplishing strategic 
or operational objectives in each theatre. A major operation consists of a series 
of related major and minor tactical actions meant to accomplish a single 
operational objective (and sometimes a limited strategic one) in a given 
part of a theatre. It is planned and executed by a single commander and in 
accordance with a common idea (scheme). A campaign in a high-intensity 
conventional war consists of a series of related major operations (land, sea, 
and air) and numerous tactical actions meant to accomplish a single strategic 
objective in a theatre. It is planned and executed by a single commander and 
according to a common idea. A campaign in operations short of war (e.g. 
in counterinsurgency) consists of numerous tactical actions and some major 
operations. All campaigns are conducted by multi-service and often multi-
national forces. In contrast major operations are conducted predominantly 
by a given service (army, air force, navy, and on rare occasions also by special 
forces) but with significant support of other services. 
Operational art dictates that the commanders and their staff keep a firm 
and unwavering focus on the operational or strategic objectives to be 
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accomplished and not on targets to be destroyed or effects to be generated. 
Prior to combat, the objectives are determined top–down, thereby ensuring 
that they are accomplished logically and coherently.
Operational art can be applied across the entire spectrum of warfare, from 
operations  short of war to high-intensity conventional war. However, because 
of the predominantly non-military character of the strategic objectives in 
operations short of war compared with high-intensity conventional war, the 
application of operational art is much more complicated. The full richness 
of operational art can only be appreciated in the framework of large-scale 
conventional operations. It is there that all of its aspects can be fully applied. In 
contrast to the Soviet/Russian practices, application of operational art should 
not be tied to the level of command or size of forces (Fűhrungsakademie der 
Bundeswehr, 1992:p.1; Fűhrungsakademie der Bundeswehr, 1993). What 
matters most is whether or not a given force has sufficient combat potential 
to accomplish an operational or strategic objective.
The operational commander should properly apply the tenets of operational 
warfare to sequence and synchronise the individual tactical actions that, 
together, accomplish the objectives determined by military or theatre strategy 
(Runnels, 1987:p.47). A series of disconnected tactical actions may ultimately 
result in an operational or even strategic success, but over a longer time and 
with more losses to friendly forces than if these actions had been an integral 
part of a campaign or major operation.
Theory and Practice
Like strategy and tactics, operational art is both an art and a science3. 
Each component of military art demands reflection, study, and practical 
3  “Science” is the possession of knowledge through study, while “art” is the performance 
of actions as acquired by experience, study, or observations (Merriam-Webster, 1981: 
p.2032). Carl von Clausewitz wrote that the object of science is knowledge, and the object 
of art is creative ability (Clausewitz, 1976: p.122). J.F.C. Fuller wrote in 1926 that to deny a 
science of war and then to theorize on war as an art is pure military alchemy, a process of 
reasoning that for thousands of years has blinded the soldier to the realities of war and will 




application. The art aspect means that operational art, like the other two 
components, is ambiguous and imprecise, requiring a creative and highly 
innovative approach to its application. Theory of operational art is universal 
because it is based on the experiences of the militaries of all civilisations and 
nations. Application of that theory depends on the national or service way 
of war, or even the personalities and leadership of individual operational 
commanders.
The theory and practice of operational art are inextricably linked. Practice 
should always dominate theory. Any time theory conflicts with practice, 
it must yield to practice. A sound theory should ensure that it is not 
disconnected from the operational realities; otherwise, it cannot provide the 
basis for a successful application of the tenets of operational warfare. At the 
same time, one should not overemphasise either theory or practice, because 
that would invariably result in a general weakening of the knowledge and 
understanding of both. The theory is critical to refining and improving 
the existing methods of applying operational warfare. Theory should deal 
with each war and each era of warfare on its own terms and should always 
accommodate itself to change. It is the task of theory, taking full advantage of 
the latest and emerging technological advances and corresponding changes 
in the character of warfare, to analyse, refine, and further develop the 
components of operational warfare and their constituent parts. The field of 
theoretical study and practical application of operational art is too large and 
too diverse to be arranged neatly into a “system” of thinking. Further, there is 
no particular order or sequence in which these components should be applied. 
The various elements that make up any given component of operational art 
are grouped because they are related to each other, and it makes it easier to 
discuss them and develop a theory (Luvaas, 1986:p.34).
The theory of operational art provides both a framework and a direction 
for the development of service and joint doctrine. Among other things, 
theoretical knowledge and understanding of a given aspect of warfare make 
improvisation easier in wartime, when both time and resources are in short 
supply. The theory also greatly improves precision in using various key 




Types of Operational Art
There are both commonalities and some significant differences in the ways 
services employ their forces. These distinctions are largely the result of the 
features of the physical environment (land, air/space, and sea/ocean) in 
which each service predominantly operates. For example, ground troops 
operate in much more diverse and, in many ways, more difficult physical 
environments than an air force. Their employment is also heavily affected 
by the situation in the air. Land warfare is conducted in two physical 
mediums (land and air), whereas war at sea is conducted in three physical 
mediums (surface, air, and subsurface). Clearly, the objectives and methods 
of employing combat forces in land, air, and naval warfare are considerably 
different. Dominance in cyberspace emerged as one of the main prerequisites 
for obtaining control in a given physical medium.
The ways that each service is employed individually or as part of multiservice 
(joint) forces differ considerably. Therefore, a distinction should be made 
between operational art specific to each service and operational art for 
multiservice/multinational (joint/combined) forces. Each service should 
be concerned chiefly with developing a theory of planning, preparing, and 
conducting their respective major/joint operations, while joint/combined 
forces should focus on the theory and practice of land or maritime campaigns 
(Figure 1)4.
The Importance of Operational Art
Operational art can offer considerable advantages to the side that practises it 
properly. Among other things, it provides a larger and broader framework 
within which tactical combat takes place. Without operational art, the war 
would be a series of randomly fought tactical actions, with relative attrition 
the only measure of success or failure.
4  The Soviets, in contrast to Western theoreticians, believed there is only a single military 
strategy, while each service develops and practises its own operational art; hence, they 
differentiated the operational art of strategic missile troops, ground forces, air forces, troops 
of air defence, and naval forces.
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The skilful application of operational art greatly enhances the prospects for 
a highly capable, well-trained, and skilfully led force, guided by a sound 
and coherent strategy, to defeat a much stronger opponent. The essence of 
operational art is to win decisively in the shortest time possible and with the 
least loss of human life and materiel. This is especially important in an era 
of smaller forces, limited resources, and low tolerance for casualties by the 
political leadership and public.
Skilful application of operational art combined with excellent leadership, 
sound doctrine, and high combat training were often the most determining 
factor for success in a war. Numerical superiority in itself is rarely sufficient 
against resourceful enemy who thinks operationally vice tactically. A well-
known and influential German theoretician, General Friedrich von Bernhardi 
(1849–1930), criticised the belief in the importance of numerical superiority 
that was so prevalent in the European armies of his time. The European 
military believed that armies armed and equipped with equal numbers 
of weapons and equipment would have similar capabilities (Bernhardi, 
1912:pp.84–85). He emphasised the need to attend to the intangible elements 
of the factors of force. Bernhardi contended that it should never be forgotten 
that moral and spiritual factors are different in each situation. They are 
also often more important than numerical factors. Sometimes, the spiritual 
strength of an army can balance other deficiencies. The influence of a single 
personality can considerably increase the capabilities of the entire army and 
even the entire state (Bernhardi, 1912:p.94).
Inferior forces have often defeated a much larger force because of the better 
quality of their leaders and the better training, morale, and discipline. For 
example, during the Seven Years’ War (1756–1763), Frederick the Great, with 
41,000 men, defeated 64,000 Austro-French troops (20,000 were not engaged) 
in the Battle at Rossbach in November. At Leuthen in December 1757, with an 
army of 35,000 men, he defeated some 65,000 Austrians (Dupuy and Dupuy, 
1986: pp.669–71). In the American Civil War (1861–1865), General Robert E. 
Lee, with fewer than 50,000 men, successfully repulsed an attack by some 
90,000 men of the Union Army in the Antietam (Sharpsburg) campaign (in 
fact, a major operation) in September 1862 (Dupuy and Dupuy, 1986:p.879). In 
the German invasion of the Benelux countries and France in May 1940, better 
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leadership and training – not better weapons – were the principal reasons 
behind the German’s phenomenal successes despite numerical inferiority. 
The Allies then had 3,740,000 soldiers vs. 2,760,000 Germans; the French 
had 3,254 tanks, but only three armoured divisions, while the Germans had 
organised their 2,574 tanks in ten panzer divisions. In contrast, the balance in 
the air did not favour the Allies. The French had only 1,090 modern aircraft 
(including 610 fighters, 130 bombers, and 350 reconnaissance aircraft); the 
British provided, in addition, 160 fighters and 272 bombers. The Germans 
had some 3,500 aircraft available (Cohen and Gooch, 1991:pp. 201 and 206).
In the Six-Day War (5–10 October 1967), the Israeli Defence Forces defeated 
quickly and decisively much larger Arab armies. The Israelis mobilised 
250,000 men, of which 225,000 were in the army (Dupuy, 1978:p.231). Their 
forces were smaller but far better led and trained than their Arab enemies. 
For the Israelis, the Sinai was the primary area of the theatre. This is why 
the Israelis concentrated some 70,000 men and 750–800 tanks on their 
southern front (Dupuy, 1978:p.244). Initially, the Israelis were strategically 
on the defensive on the Jordanian and Syrian fronts (Dupuy, 1978:p.233). 
In contrast, the Egyptian army’s strength was fragmented. Some 50,000 
men were deployed in Yemen (because of Egyptian intervention in a civil 
war), and 70,000 troops were scattered west of the Suez Canal (to deal with 
a potential landing of the Anglo-French forces). This left only approximately 
100,000 troops defending the Sinai. Most of the Egyptian troops were ill-
trained (Dupuy, 1978:p.236).
An excellent and relatively recent example of successful planning and 
execution of major/joint operations by a small country was the Croatian 
liberation of the Krajina in August 1995 (operation Oluja-Storm). The battle 
line extended for some 630 kilometres. The area under control of the Serbian 
rebels was approximately 11,500 square kilometres. All three services (army, 
air force, and navy) plus special police of the Ministry of Interior (Rakić 
and Dubravica, 2009:p.259; Domazet-Lošo, 2002:p.119) took part in the 
operation. The Croats employed some 184,000 troops against 50,000 Serbian 
rebels, which gave them 3.7 to 1.0 superiority (Domazet-Lošo, 2002:p.119). 
The Croatian army operated from a long and unfavourable exterior base 
of operations. The plan of the operation was based on cutting off the rebel 
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forces by almost simultaneous attacks and advancing along some 20 major 
and minor axes of advance (thrusts), including three thrusts from western 
Herzegovina (Rakić and Dubravica, 2009:p. map 3.2.). This, in turn, was one 
of the primary reasons that the entire operation was successfully completed 
in only four days. The Serbs were poorly organised and suffered from low 
morale. They offered weak or no resistance to the advancing Croatian troops.
Operational art highlights the need for the commanders and their staffs 
to comprehend fully not only military but also non-military (diplomatic, 
political, economic, financial, social, religious, etc.) aspects of the situation 
in a given theatre when they plan, prepare, and execute major campaigns 
or operations. It also emphasises that, in modern times, national (or theatre) 
strategic objectives cannot be accomplished without the properly sequenced 
and synchronised employment of multiservice and often multinational 
forces. This, in turn, requires the highest degree of cooperation or jointness 
among the services. The employment of two or more services can significantly 
neutralise the disadvantages of one service by exploiting the advantages of 
other services.
Knowledge and understanding of operational art are essential to the 
success of subordinate tactical commanders as well. To act in accordance 
with the operational commander’s intent, major tactical commanders need 
to understand a broader, that is, operational, picture of the situation. By 
understanding operational art, they can reach decisions that will contribute 
significantly to the accomplishment of the overall operational or strategic 
objective.
The study of past campaigns and major operations greatly improves the 
quality of officers’ professional education. Among other things, the study of 
the history of operational warfare underscores the fact that all fundamental 
areas of warfare are critical to success and, in particular, emphasises that it is 
invariably wrong to artificially divide warfare into offensive and defensive 





Success in the practical application of operational warfare is difficult to achieve 
unless several prerequisites are met. Among other things, the conduct of 
major operations and campaigns requires sufficient physical space for one’s 
forces to manoeuvre freely. The operational commander’s mastery of tactics 
in his chosen specialty is a key prerequisite for success at the operational 
and strategic levels of war.  The operational commanders and their staffs 
have to think operationally vice tactically. Among other things, operational 
thinking means differentiating between essential and non-essential or even 
trivial events in a situation. It impresses on the operational commander 
the need to ensure that all actions and measures are planned and executed 
within a broader framework dictated by policy and strategy. The most 
important prerequisite is an operational perspective, the ability to see clearly 
and objectively the essentials of the military and non-military aspects of the 
situation in a given theatre. The operational commander should possess at 
least an approximately accurate picture of the situation several weeks or even 
months into the future (Manstein, 1982:p.409). The operational commanders 
should also have good knowledge and understanding of the non-military 
aspects of the situation and trends in a given part of the theatre. Another 
prerequisite for the success of a major operation or campaign is continuous 
and effective operational support (operational intelligence, information 
operations, operational logistics, and operational protection). 
The operational commanders and their staffs should use commonly 
accepted and understood operational terms; otherwise, communications 
within a service and among services become difficult, if not impossible. 
It does little good to recognise a problem and formulate an approach to it 
if the language with which it is expressed is confused or uncertain. As the 
late Henry E. Eccles (professor at the US Naval War College) so eloquently 
wrote, “strict accuracy should regulate our use of language“. 
Thoughts should be expressed with perspicuity and correctness. False 
logic, disguised by specious phraseology, too often gains the assent of the 
unthinking multitude, disseminating far and wide the seeds of prejudice 
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and error. A misapplied or misapprehended term is sufficient to give rise 
to fierce and interminable disputes” (Eccles, 1965:p.5).
Relationships
All three components of military art are closely related. Their mutual 
relationships are highly dynamic. Also, there is no clear-cut line separating 
these three components (Figure 2). Actions and events at the tactical level 
often affect strategy and policy in the most profound ways. Likewise, the 
application of operational art considerably influences both strategy and 
policy on one hand and tactics on the other.
Strategy and policy should always dominate operational art and tactics. A 
significant problem arises when operational art begins to interfere with or, 
even worse, dominate policy and strategy either intentionally or by default. 
The strategy should invariably dominate operational art; otherwise, the 
results will be fatal (Jablonsky, 1987a:p.73). For example, the Axis campaign 
in North Africa in 1941–1942 was driven and dominated by operational, 
and sometimes even tactical, vice strategic, considerations. Field Marshal 
Erwin Rommel’s (1891–1944) successes against the Allies led to the steady 
expansion of the Axis war aims, which, in turn, required more forces to be 
drawn into a secondary theatre of operation. Rommel tried to advance to 
the Suez Canal and seize Middle Eastern oil fields far beyond a reasonable 
distance from his bases of support, resulting in a serious mismatch between 
ends and means (Glanz, 1963:p.5; Jablonsky, 1987a:p.74).
In general, strategy guides operational art by determining the ultimate 
objectives to be accomplished and allocating necessary military and 
non-military resources. Strategy also defines and imposes limits on the 
employment of one’s combat forces and imposes conditions on tactical 
combat. To be successful, major operations or campaigns must be conducted 
within a framework of what is operationally and strategically possible 
(Jablonsky, 1987b:p.14).
Whenever the ends and means at the strategic level are seriously disconnected 
or mismatched, brilliance at the operational and tactical level, as the Germans 
30
Milan Vego
consistently displayed in World War II, can only delay, but not prevent, 
ultimate defeat. The situation becomes untenable if the political leadership 
is unwilling to commit all available sources of power, as the example of the 
USA in the Vietnam War (1965–1975) demonstrates.
Poor application of operational art can lead to tactical defeats, which, in 
turn, may have operational as well as strategic consequences. For example, 
the Japanese Combined Fleet suffered a decisive defeat in the Battle of 
Midway because of a flawed operational plan, despite the overwhelming 
Japanese superiority in forces. This example perhaps best demonstrates how 
the superiority of one’s forces can easily be squandered when operational 
thinking on the part of operational commanders is inadequate or entirely 
lacking.
Tactics is both the art and science of planning, preparing, and employing 
individual platforms, weapons and associated sensors, and single/combat 
combat arms/branches to accomplish tactical objectives. Moltke the Elder 
observed that tactics are the basis of operations (operational art today). 
Tactics should create the prerequisites for operational or strategic success, 
which the operational commander must then exploit (Fűhrungsakademie 
der Bundeswehr, 1992:pp.17–18). Tactics should ensure that results are in 
harmony with operational art and strategy. Generally, a tactical action should 
not be fought unless it is part of the operational design and contributes directly 
to the accomplishment of operational or strategic objectives. Tactical victories 
are meaningless if they are fought outside the operational framework. For 
example, in the Battle for Leyte, Admiral William F. Halsey (1882–1959), 
commander, US Third Fleet, won a tactical victory in the Battle off Cape 
Engano with his Task Force 38 (TF-38; fast carrier force) over a much smaller 
and weaker Japanese carrier force on 25 October 1944. However, his decision to 
uncover San Bernardino Strait almost led to the failure of the entire supporting 
major naval operation. The Third Fleet’s mission in the Leyte operation was to 
provide effective distant (operational) cover and support to the Allied forces 
that landed on Leyte. Only Vice Admiral Takeo Kurita’s decision to turn north 
and leave the scene of action when his force was on the verge of defeating the 
US escort carrier group in the Battle off Samar on 25 October saved the Allies 
from suffering an ignominious defeat at the hands of a much weaker force.
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The accomplishment of operational and strategic objectives depends on the 
results obtained by tactics. Strategy, for its part should ensure that tactical 
combat is conducted under conditions favourable for accomplishing strategic 
objectives. Bad tactics can invalidate a good strategy and operational art. 
Therefore, a sufficient level of tactical competence is always required to 
achieve strategic or operational objectives. For example, the US Navy did 
not match tactical skills with the Japanese during the protracted struggle for 
Guadalcanal (August 1942–February 1943). However, the Allies ultimately 
won because they matched means and ends at the operational and strategic 
levels better than the Japanese did. Defeats in a major operation, such as 
those of the Germans at Stalingrad (November 1942–January 1943) and 
the Japanese at the Battle of Midway (June 1942) in the Midway-Aleutians 
operation, can not only doom the entire major operation, but also have an 
immediate and profound effect on the strategic situation in a given theatre.
Perhaps the worst thing to do is to confuse tactics with strategy and strategy 
with the conduct of war, as the Imperial Japanese Navy did in the pre-war 
years. The Japanese were fixated on the single decisive battle, after the 
manner of the Battle of Jutland on 30 May-1 June 1916. That preoccupation 
guided their tactical doctrine and ship designs. However, this resulted in a 
powerful surface force that was both one-dimensional and brittle (Evans and 
Peattie, 1997:p.515).
In operations short of war, relatively small tactical defeats, or even the 
perception of the insurgents’ strength, can often undermine a country’s 
will to fight. For example, the French defeat at Dien Bien Phu in 1954 in 
the First Indochina War and the North Vietnamese/Vietcong Tet offensive 
in January–February 1968 were not militarily crippling; however, they 
decisively undermined popular and political support for the war in France 
and the USA, respectively (Jablonsky, 1987a:p.71).  
Tactics should never be allowed to significantly influence, much less 
dominate, strategy, either by design or by default. If this occurs, strategy 
will be defined by tactical considerations, or even applied as an afterthought 
(Handel, 2001:p.355). The principal reasons for what the late Dr Michael 
Handel called the “tacticization” of strategy have been the uncontrolled 
32
Milan Vego
ambition of military field commanders and the tactically oriented thinking 
of political leaders. The ever-increasing reliance on advanced weaponry and 
sensors, coupled with the reluctance to accept unnecessary casualties in a 
conflict involving no vital national interests, has created a situation in which 
targeting has become a de facto substitute for sound strategy.
Tactical brilliance can rarely overcome poor operational performance. Then, 
no number of tactical victories can save one’s forces from ultimate defeat. 
A lack of operational thinking invariably results in wasting the fruits of 
tactical victories. For example, the German offensive on the western front in 
April 1918 resulted in heavy losses for the Allies and a considerable gain of 
space for the Germans (Bassenge, 1964:pp.19–20). Despite a series of tactical 
victories, the Germans failed to expand their penetrations into operational 
breakthroughs at any part of the western front. Hence, the key prerequisite 
for reaching a strategic decision was not achieved. Moreover, the Germans’ 
local gains in terrain resulted in a longer front line to be defended. The 
German army was morally and psychologically exhausted. In summer, the 
Germans reverted to defence (Meier-Dornberg, 1988:p.73). The Allies gained 
the initiative that eventually led to an armistice in November 1918 and ended 
in Germany’s defeat.
Tactics can sometimes be heavily influenced by politics, especially domestic 
policy considerations. This excessive “politicisation” of one component 
of military art often has fatal consequences for military effectiveness as 
a whole. For example, the French tactical doctrine of “offensive at any 
price” before 1914 affected the operational level. During World War I, as 
casualties mounted and the public outcry became deafening, this doctrine 
became increasingly disconnected from the strategic reality (Beck, 1955:p.79; 
Fűhrungsakademie der Bundeswehr, 1992:p.15; Jablonsky, 1987a:p.73).
Characteristics
The principal characteristics of operational warfare, compared with tactical 
actions, are larger dimensions of forces, time, and space. The main reason 
for these differences is the much larger scale of an operational or strategic 
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objective. Major operations and campaigns are conducted in large parts of 
the theatre. A tactical action can last hours or even minutes, while a major 
operation is conducted over several days or even weeks. The duration of a 
typical campaign varies greatly, from weeks to several months or even much 
longer as in the case of insurgency or counterinsurgency. The accomplishment 
of operational or strategic objectives requires the employment of larger and 
more diverse forces than does the accomplishment of tactical objectives. In 
the past, large and diverse forces (numbered and theatre armies, fleets, and 
air fleets) were typically required to conduct a campaign or major operation. 
This is not the case today, where a relatively small force can be employed to 
accomplish an operational or, in some special cases, even a limited strategic 
objective. What counts most is not the numerical strength of one’s forces but 
their combat potential. Another factor is the perceived strength or weakness 
of the enemy’s forces. Even in the past, therefore, relatively small forces were 
able to accomplish operational or even strategic objectives. For example, the 
Field Marshall Arthur Wellesley, 1st Duke of Wellington (1769–1852) in his 
successful Peninsular Campaign in Spain (1809) had a much smaller force 
than the French had. The US general Winfield Scott’s landing at Vera Cruz, 
Mexico, in early March 1847 was carried out by approximately 12,000 troops 
and had a strategic effect on the outcome of the Mexican–American War 
(Adams and Newell, 1988:p.35).
In several instances in World War II, forces no larger than an army corps 
conducted major operations. For example, just before their invasion of France 
in May 1940, the Germans formed their first armoured operational-size force, 
Panzergruppe von Kleist (an army in all but name), which, in cooperation 
with the Luftwaffe, was capable of conducting major land operations. This 
force was the key factor in the successful German penetration of the French 
defences at Sedan and in the subsequent advance to the French Channel 
coast that eventually cut off the major part of the French and British troops 
in northwestern France. The Japanese 25th Army led by General Tomoyuki 
Yamashita (1885–1946) and composed of three divisions with only 35,000 
men but strongly supported by air and naval forces, conquered Malaya in 
just three months. Of the initial British force of some 70,000 troops (plus 
15,000 administrative and unarmed personnel), 62,000 British, Indian, and 
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Australian troops surrendered unconditionally to the Japanese after the fall 
of Singapore (Dear and Foot, 1995:pp.1009–1010). Likewise, for the invasion 
of the Philippines, the Japanese assigned the Southern Army, composed 
of only two infantry divisions plus supporting troops consisting of seven 
regiments (four of which were combat troops) and six battalions (Morton, 
1953:p.59). The main forces employed in May 1941 in the ill-fated German 
attempt to destroy British convoys in the North Atlantic (Rheinübung, Rhine 
Exercise) were organised into a combat group (Kampfgruppe) composed of 
a single battleship Bismarck and a heavy cruiser Prinz Eugen (Mallmann 
Showell, 1990:p.201).
Because of the larger scale of operational/strategic objectives and 
consequently the larger force involved, planning for campaigns/major 
operations is more complex and requires more time than planning for a 
tactical action. Campaigns and major operations are planned by using 
regressive (inverse) methods, in which the ultimate (strategic or operational) 
objective is determined first and from that a series of intermediate military 
objectives (operational or major tactical) is determined. The deployment of 
one’s combat forces taking part in a campaign or major operation encompasses 
a much larger physical space and requires far more time to complete than 
deployment for a tactical action. More important, errors in deploying one’s 
forces into a theatre can fatally affect the initial phase and even the outcome 
of a campaign or major operation. Combat force deployment forms the very 
heart of a plan for a major operation or campaign; it directly influences 
not only the accomplishment of the next operational objective but also the 
subsequent decisions made in combat.
Because of the relatively long duration of major operations and campaigns and 
the diversity of participating forces, the logistical support and sustainment 
are more complex to organise and execute than they are for tactical actions. 
The operational commander is normally vested with the responsibility 
of organising and controlling logistical support and sustainment, while a 




Operational art is the only means of orchestrating and tying together tactical 
actions within a larger design that directly contributes to the objectives set 
by policy and strategy. Tactics alone cannot lead to the accomplishment of 
the operational or strategic objective unless it is not an integral part of a 
broader operational framework. The sound application of operational art is 
the key to winning decisively in the shortest time and with the least loss 
of men and materiel. All past wars were won or lost at the strategic and 
operational levels, not at the tactical level. Generally, the smaller the one’s 
forces, the more critical is to properly apply operational art. The history of 
past wars has demonstrated that neither superior technology nor superb 
tactics can ensure, by themselves, victory in a war. An exclusive focus 
on technology or tactics is likely to result in time-consuming and costly 
attritional warfare against a resourcefull and robust opponent. Moreover, 
relying solely on better technology would rob warfare of its “art.” It would 
make one’s forces vulnerable to an opponent who, although technologically 
inferior, thinks better and faster and uses his smaller forces more creatively, 
perhaps asymmetrically. 
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